

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the  
Eastern District of Wisconsin

ROMEO DENZELL VEASLEY )

*Plaintiff* )

v. )

CLINT CORWIN, et al. )

*Defendant* )

Civil Action No. 23-C-132

## NOTICE OF A LAWSUIT AND REQUEST TO WAIVE SERVICE OF A SUMMONS

To: Clint Corwin

*(Name of the defendant or - if the defendant is a corporation, partnership, or association - an officer or agent authorized to receive service)*

### Why are you getting this?

A lawsuit has been filed against you, or the entity you represent, in this court and under the number shown above. A copy of the complaint is attached.

This is not a summons, or an official notice from the court. It is a request that, to avoid expenses, you waive formal service of a summons by signing and returning the enclosed waiver. To avoid these expenses, you must return the signed waiver within 30 days (*give at least 30 days, or at least 60 days if the defendant is outside any judicial district of the United States*) from the date shown below, which is the date this notice was sent. Two copies of the waiver form are enclosed, along with a stamped, self-addressed envelope or other prepaid means for returning one copy. You may keep the other copy.

### What happens next?

If you return the signed waiver, I will file it with the court. The action will then proceed as if you had been served on the date the waiver is filed, but no summons will be served on you and you will have 60 days from the date this notice is sent (see the date below) to answer the complaint (or 90 days if this notice is sent to you outside any judicial district of the United States).

If you do not return the signed waiver within the time indicated, I will arrange to have the summons and complaint served on you. And I will ask the court to require you, or the entity you represent, to pay the expenses of making service.

Please read the enclosed statement about the duty to avoid unnecessary expenses.

I certify that this request is being sent to you on the date below.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

s/ Romeo Denzell Veasley #512273

*Signature of attorney or unrepresented plaintiff*

Romeo Denzell Veasley #512273

*Printed Name*

Racine Correctional Institution

*Address*

*Telephone number*

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the  
Eastern District of Wisconsin

ROMEO DENZELL VEASLEY )

*Plaintiff* )

v. )

CLINT CORWIN, et al. )

*Defendant* )

Civil Action No. 23-C-132

## WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF A SUMMONS

To: Romeo Denzell Veasley #512273

*(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)*

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 4/12/2023, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Clint Corwin

*Printed Name of Party Waiving Service*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Signature of attorney or unrepresented defendant*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Printed Name*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Address*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Telephone number*

## Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

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ROMEO DENZELL VEASLEY,  
Plaintiff(s),

v.

Case No. 23-C-132

CLINT CORWIN, et al.,  
Defendant(s).

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**CONSENT TO PROCEED BEFORE A U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

This form must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 21 days of receipt. Although choosing to have your case decided by a magistrate judge is optional and refusal will not have adverse substantive consequences, the timely return of this completed form is mandatory.

If you do not consent to a magistrate judge deciding your case, a district judge will handle all aspects of your case. When a case is handled by a district judge, magistrate judges in this district play no further role in the case and do not issue reports and recommendations.

Magistrate judges do not conduct felony trials, and therefore felony trials do not interfere with scheduling and processing of cases before magistrate judges.

**Check one:**

- ☐ The undersigned attorney of record or pro se litigant **consents** to have **Magistrate Judge Stephen C Dries** conduct all proceedings in this case, including a bench or jury trial, and enter final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b).
- ☐ The undersigned attorney of record or pro se litigant **refuses** to have a magistrate judge enter final judgment in this matter. I understand that this means that a district judge alone will handle all further proceedings in this matter.

Signed this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_.  
(Day) (Month) (Year)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of counsel of record or pro se litigant

- ☐ Plaintiff/Petitioner (attorney or pro se litigant)  
☐ Defendant/Respondent (attorney or pro se litigant)  
☐ Other Party

ASSIGNMENT OF CIVIL CASES  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

At the time a new civil action is filed, it is assigned by random selection to either a district judge or a magistrate judge in accordance with the local rules. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a United States Magistrate Judge may, with the consent of the parties, conduct all proceedings in this civil action, including a bench or jury trial and order the entry of judgment. The statute provides for direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Once the assigned district or magistrate judge has been selected, the local rules of this district require that each party to the action receive a copy of the "consent form." Each party shall complete the form and return it to the Clerk of Court **within 21 days** after its receipt.


If this case has been randomly assigned to a **district judge** and all parties consent to have the magistrate judge conduct all proceedings in the case, the district judge may enter an order transferring the case to the magistrate judge.

If this case has been randomly assigned to a **magistrate judge** and not all parties consent, then the case will be reassigned by random selection to a district judge. If all parties consent, the magistrate judge will conduct all proceedings in this action.

While the decision to consent or not to consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the magistrate judge is entirely voluntary, the duty to respond to this order is **mandatory**. Your response shall be made to the Clerk of Court only on the form on the reverse side of this notice.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED**, that you complete this form and return it to the Clerk of Court within **twenty-one (21) days** from receipt.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'P. Pepper', is written over a horizontal line.

Honorable Pamela Pepper,  
Chief Judge



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

CLERK USDC EDWI  
FILE

2023 FEB 1 12 23 34

ROMEO DENZELL VEASLEY,

Plaintiff,

-v-

Case No. 18CF5045

SERGEANT CORWIN, OFFICER  
LUKE BINTER, JOHN DOE OFFICER I,  
JOHN DOE OFFICER II, JOHN DOE OFFICER  
III, et. al.

Defendants.

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COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS  
42 U.S.C. § 1983

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1. Romeo Denzell Veasley  
Romeo D. Veasley  
ID Number 512273  
Racine Correctional Institution  
P.O.Box 900  
2019 Wisconsin Street  
Sturtevant, WI 53177-0900
2. Clint Corwin  
Sergeant  
Milwaukee Police Department  
721 West State Street  
Milwaukee, WI 53233
3. Luke Binter  
Police Officer  
Milwaukee Police Department  
721 West State Street  
Milwaukee, WI 53233
4. John Doe I, II and III  
Police Officers  
Milwaukee Police Department  
721 West State Street

Milwaukee, WI 53233.

## II. Basis for Jurisdiction

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, you may sue state or local officials for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal laws]."

A. Are you bringing suit against (check all that apply):

☐ Federal officials

☒ State or local officials

B. Section 1983 allows claims alleging the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal laws]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If you are suing under section 1983, what federal constitutional or statutory right(s) do you claim is/are being violated by state or local officials?

Fourth Amendment excessive force and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Equal Protection.

Defendants are being sued in their personal and official capacities while acting under color of state law and authority.

C. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the constitution, Laws and treaties of the United States and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) because this action seeks to redress the deprivation under color of state law of Plaintiff Romeo Denzell Veasley civil rights.

D. This court has jurisdiction to grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201 and 2202, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57.

#### VENUE

5. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §139(b) because one or more of the defendants resides in this district.

#### PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Romeo D. Veasley ("Veasley"), at all times relevant to this action was and always has been a citizen of the United States, and State of Wisconsin. Romeo D. Veasley was a free world citizen living within the County and City of Milwaukee, (Milwaukee) Wisconsin.

7. Defendants Clint Corwin and Luke Binter, as well John Doe I, II & III, were Police Officers in the city of Milwaukee Milwaukee County, at all times relevant to this action and presently to Plaintiff's knowledge still are employed with Milwaukee Police Department.

8. All defendants named herein were sworn officer to protect and defend all citizens within the city of Milwaukee, instead these officers subjected Plaintiff to an excessive force where they physically assaulted and battered Plaintiff.

#### STATEMENT OF CLAIM

9. On the approximate date of October 18, 2018, where Plaintiff was driving his car and was on a parking lot when

the defendants broke the window out of Plaintiff's car.

10. The front door some how came ajar, the Plaintiff fearing for his life and safety tried to drive backwards in an attempt to get onto the roadway.

11. Officer Binter abandoned what he was doing and ran over purportedly to get the Plaintiff out of his vehicle. Plaintiff was a larger man, so, officer Binter, who is also a larger person felt he could take plaintiff to the ground.

12. Plaintiff a person with mental health issues. He has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. He's been hospitalized Winnebago where he was committed for several months being treated for psychological problems.

13. Plaintiff has been prescribed Haldol and Trazadone which are traditionally antipsychotic medications to treat Plaintiff's illness which has been prescribed for some ten years.

14. Plaintiff has also been taking "amitriptyline, which is Elavil" prescribed for his depression.

15. Defendants busted out his car window and pulled him forcefully from the vehicle, and they used extreme violence against him, beating the crap out of him.

16. Defendants punched Plaintiff repeatedly in the face with so much force that one of the defendants sustained physical injury to his knuckles which were bruised and bleeding.

17. defendants applied excessive force not reasonable force when they subdued Plaintiff, so much so that they broke Plaintiff nose, and caused him to tear his anterior cruciate ligament.



18. Plaintiff was severely beaten by the defendants so much until the Court in his sentence described the photographs of his injuries as extreme.

19. Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries, his anterior cruciate ligament was torn, laceration to the face that needed stitches, a broken nose as a result of the excessive force used against him by the defendants unnecessarily.

20. These injuries were in fact sustained by the Plaintiff before any said transaction occurred between the Plaintiff and the would be Confidential Source.

21. The officers punched Plaintiff repeatedly in the face with a closed fist so much so until the officer sustained injury to his knuckle and hand. This was noted by the criminal court when it was sentencing Plaintiff.

22. While the Plaintiff were in handcuffs and subdued the officers continued to pummel and punch Plaintiff about the head and face. Then they stripped pants off him in the parking lot, making him sit in his underwear on the curb in the Walgreen's parking lot, while they searched Plaintiff's vehicle.

23. Defendants did not have Plaintiff's permission to use excessive force against him, did not have permission to pummel and punch plaintiff until he was a bloody pulp.

24. Plaintiff has photographic evidence which shows a pretty strong indication that a great deal of force was used on him under the guise of his arrest.

25. Defendants were not empowered to beat citizens they

are arresting or using excessive force upon them and clearly in this instance excessive force was used against Plaintiff.

#### CAUSES OF ACTION

26. Defendants herein named in this suit have acted with excessive force or otherwise used unnecessary force to Plaintiff in violation of his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments' Rights of the United States Constitution.

#### RELIEF REQUESTED

27. Whereas, Romeo D. Veasley, requests relief from the court as follows:

1. Compensatory damages in the amount of \$500,000 dollars sum same and sure, against each herein named defendant jointly and severally for the excessive force carried out against Veasley

2. Punitive damages in the amount of \$500,000 dollars against each herein named defendants jointly and severally for violations of Mr. Veasley rights for using excessive force against him unnecessarily.

#### JURY TRIAL DEMAND

28. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury with no less than six (6) jurors under the 7th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a).

Dated this 29<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2023.

Respectfully submitted by:

Romeo Veasley  
Romeo Veasley, Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

---

ROMEO DENZELL VEASLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 23-C-132

CLINT CORWIN, et al.,

Defendants.

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**SCREENING ORDER**

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Plaintiff Romeo Denzell Veasley, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at the Racine Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court to screen the complaint and address on Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Dkt. Nos. 1 & 4.

**MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE**

Plaintiff requested leave to proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee (*in forma pauperis*). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding *in forma pauperis* is required to pay the full amount of the \$350.00 filing fee over time. *See* 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Plaintiff filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). Dkt. No. 5. Based on that document, the Court waived the initial partial filing fee because Plaintiff neither had the assets nor the means to pay. Dkt. No. 6. The Court directed Plaintiff to notify the Clerk's office by March 20, 2023 if he wished to voluntarily dismiss the case to avoid the possibility of incurring a strike under §1915(g).

*Id.* at 3. Plaintiff did not voluntarily dismiss the case by the deadline. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and will screen the complaint below.

#### SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT

The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, Plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused.

“The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Id.* A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”



*Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Id.* at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Id.* at 555 (internal quotations omitted).

#### **ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT**

Plaintiff has a variety of mental health issues, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia for which he takes various strong medications. Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶12-14. On October 18, 2018, Defendants City of Milwaukee Police Officers Clint Corwin, Luke Binter, and John Does #1-3 broke the window on Plaintiff’s car while he was driving in a parking lot. *Id.*, ¶¶7-9. Fearing for his life, Plaintiff tried to drive backwards onto the roadway. *Id.*, ¶10. Defendants then ran towards Plaintiff’s car and “busted out his car window.” *Id.*, ¶¶11 & 15. They pulled Plaintiff from his car and starting “beating the crap out of him.” *Id.*, ¶15. Defendants repeatedly punched Plaintiff in the face, breaking his nose and tearing his anterior cruciate ligament. *Id.*, ¶¶16-21. Defendants’ knuckles were also bruised and bleeding following the incident. *Id.*, ¶¶17 & 21. After Plaintiff was subdued and in handcuffs, Defendants continued to punch him in the head and face until he was a “bloody pulp.” *Id.*, ¶¶22-23. Plaintiff needed stitches on his face following the incident. *Id.*, ¶19. According to Plaintiff, a Wisconsin state court judge described photos of his injuries as “extreme.” *Id.*, ¶¶18 & 24. For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. *Id.*, ¶27.

#### **THE COURT’S ANALYSIS**

“To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” *D.S.*

*v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp.*, 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing *Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee*, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)).

A claim that police officers used excessive force during an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. *Avina v. Bohlen*, 882 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing *Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago*, 624 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2010)). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege that an officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the “specific circumstances of the arrest, including ‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [] actively resist[ed] arrest or attempt[ed] to evade arrest by flight.’” *Cyrus*, 624 F.3d at 861–62 (quoting *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 396, (1989)).

Plaintiff alleges that, during his arrest, Defendants repeatedly punched him in the face, breaking his nose and tearing his anterior cruciate ligament. Then, after Plaintiff was subdued and in handcuffs, Defendants continued to punch him in the head and face until he was a “bloody pulp.” Based on these allegations, the Court can reasonably infer that Defendants may have used excessive force to effectuate his arrest on October 18, 2018. Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Corwin, Binter, and John Does #1-3 in connection with the October 18, 2018 incident.

The Court notes that, in Wisconsin, the statute of limitations for an incident that accrued after April 5, 2018 is three years. *Huber v. Anderson*, 909 F.3d 201, 207 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 2017 Wis. Act 235 (eff. Apr. 5, 2018)); *see also D’Acquisto v. Love*, No. 20-C-1034, 2020 WL 5982895, at \*1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 8, 2020) (explaining that the Wisconsin legislature changed the relevant statute of limitations from six years to three years). Although federal courts borrow the statute of limitations from state law, “the accrual date of a §1983 cause of action is a question of

federal law that is *not* resolved by reference to state law.” *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the clock starts when the constitutional violation is complete, and the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. *Id.*; *O’Gorman v. City of Chicago*, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015). In an excessive force case, the claim accrues at the time the force was purportedly applied. *See Walker v. City of Chicago*, 559 F. Supp. 3d 747, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2021). To comply with Wisconsin’s statute of limitations, Plaintiff likely had to file his complaint within three years of the date his claim accrued, or by October 18, 2021. Plaintiff did not do so and, instead, waited until February 2023 to file this lawsuit. If Defendants intend to raise and litigate this issue, they shall do so in a timely manner, consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

#### CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Milwaukee Police Officers Corwin, Binter, and John Does #1-3 in connection with the October 18, 2018 incident.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee (Dkt. No. 4) is **GRANTED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint and this order upon Corwin and Binter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Plaintiff is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a). The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is \$8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.114(a)(2)–(3). Although Congress requires the Court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service precisely because *in forma pauperis* plaintiffs are indigent, it has not made any provision for these fees to be waived



either by the Court or by the U.S. Marshals Service. The U.S. Marshals Service will give Plaintiff information on how to remit payment. The Court is not involved in the collection of the fee.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Corwin and Binter shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that copies of the complaint and this order be sent to the City Attorney for the City of Milwaukee.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the agency having custody of the prisoner shall collect from his institution trust account the **\$350.00** balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action. If Plaintiff is transferred to another institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this order along with Plaintiff's remaining balance to the receiving institution.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that copies of this order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Plaintiff is confined.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the parties may not begin discovery until after the Court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions must submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. The Prisoner E-Filing Program is mandatory for all inmates of Green Bay Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, Columbia Correctional Institution,



and Oshkosh Correctional Institution. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities must submit the original document for each filing to the Court to the following address:

Office of the Clerk  
United States District Court  
Eastern District of Wisconsin  
362 United States Courthouse  
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the matter.

Plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.

Enclosed is a guide prepared by court staff to address common questions that arise in cases filed by prisoners. Entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions,” this guide contains information that Plaintiff may find useful in prosecuting this case.

Dated at Green Bay, Wisconsin this 12th day of April, 2023.

s/ William C. Griesbach  
William C. Griesbach  
United States District Judge